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Fracturing the Rule of Capture: The Improper
Application of the Rule of Capture to Subsurface
Intrusions Resulting from Hydraulic Fracturing
Alexis K. Désiré*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that during the course of hydraulically fracturing a tract
of land—a process used to extract gas from low-permeability rock
formations—a drilling company causes fractures, as well as some of the
materials necessary to the fracturing process, to cross the boundary of its
property line and enter an adjoining property—that is, it makes a
subsurface intrusion onto a neighbor’s property. 1 Assume further that,
because the company’s fractures have extended into the neighbor’s
property, oil and gas from the neighboring land travel to the company’s
wellbore, causing the neighbor to bring a tort action against the company
for harms related to the draining of its minerals. Should a court find that
the company’s actions constitute an actionable subsurface trespass?
Instead of focusing on this question, courts that have confronted
the issue to date have instead focused on whether the rule of capture
precludes liability rather than on whether a subsurface intrusion resulting
from hydraulic fracturing constitutes subsurface trespass.2 In Texas, the
trespass issue was neglected altogether, while in Pennsylvania, the finding
of a trespass lacked analysis and was based on the long-rejected doctrine
of ad coelum, which means that landowners own everything above and
below their land, up to the sky and down to the core of the Earth.3 Given
the extensive use of hydraulic fracturing across the country, the question
of whether a subsurface trespass has occurred will likely appear repeatedly
until the law is settled in this area.
*

J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School. Sincere thanks to Professor Cary Coglianese for his
feedback and support. I would also like to thank Kristen DeWilde for her helpful suggestions, and
the editors of the Seattle Journal of Technology, Environmental & Innovation Law, particularly
Ayesha Falaknaz, for their dedicated editorial assistance and patience.
1
Ground Water Protection Council & ALL Consulting, Modern Shale Gas Development in the
United States: A Primer, 8 (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter Ground Water Protection Council].
2
The Texas Supreme Court in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.
2008); the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia in Stone v.
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2013 WL 2097397; and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Briggs
v. Southwestern Energy Production Company, 184 A.3d 153 (2018).
3
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). Briggs v. Southwestern
Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153 (2018). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is currently deciding an
appeal of this decision.
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To present an answer to the issue, I first address the doctrine that has
taken up most of the discussion: the rule of capture. The main purpose of
this Comment is to argue that the rule of capture should not apply to
hydraulic fracturing cases, a question that has not been thoroughly
explored to date by scholarship or courts. In Part I of this Comment, I
provide background on hydraulic fracturing and discuss the justifications
for the rule of capture. I then proceed to discuss limitations on the rule of
capture. Part I ends with an exploration of how subsurface trespass has
been handled in analogous situations. In Part II, I explain why the rule of
capture should not apply to hydraulic fracturing. Not only do the doctrine’s
rationales not apply to hydraulic fracturing, but judicially imposed
limitations on the rule confirm the doctrine’s inapplicability to the issue of
subsurface trespass. In this part, I argue that subsurface trespasses
resulting from hydraulic fracturing should only be actionable when the
plaintiff can prove harm and when the defendant’s actions are intentional.
Finally, in Part III, I show that subsurface intrusion resulting from
hydraulic fracturing is actionable under trespass. I first assess the policy
considerations driving the arguments behind two leading court cases
confronted with the issue. I then analyze a solution to the problem from a
leading scholar–that an intentional trespass doctrine can be used instead of
the rule of capture.
II.

THE BASICS: HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, RULE OF CAPTURE, AND
TRESPASS

“Drainage! Drainage, Eli, you boy. Drained dry. I’m so sorry. Here, if
you have a milkshake, and I have a milkshake, and I have a straw. There
it is, that’s a straw, you see? You watching? And my straw reaches across
the room, and starts to drink your milkshake… I… drink… your…
milkshake! I drink it up!” —There Will Be Blood
The issue of subsurface trespass resulting from hydraulic
fracturing implicates two distinct but interrelated theories of law: the rule
of capture and trespass. This Part offers an overview of these theories of
law after discussing the process of hydraulic fracturing.
A. Hydraulic Fracturing: Purpose and Process
Hydraulic fracturing, which is commonly referred to as
“fracking,” is the process by which oil and gas are released from lowpermeability rocks, such as shale.4 Although fracking has been used to
increase the production of oil and gas from conventional wells since the
1940s, its ability to produce unconventional natural gas from tight shale
formations has caused it to become one of today’s fastest-growing trends
in onshore domestic oil and gas production.5
4

Ground Water Protection Council, supra note 1.
Charles G. Groat & Thomas W. Grimshaw, Fact-Based Regulation for Environmental Protection
in Shale Gas Development 7 (The Energy Inst. at The University of Texas at Austin, 2012). Natural
gas is a mixture of light‐end, flammable hydrocarbons composed primarily of methane. A.L.
5
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1. The Purpose of Hydraulic Fracturing
Although oil and gas have historically been described as
percolating and fugacious, naturally flowing and pooling underground, the
majority of today’s accessible oil and gas is trapped in the micropores of
tight rock formations. 6 The permeability of those formations, which is
measured by the ease with which fluids flow through a rock via
interconnections between pores, is extremely limited, making it nearly
impossible for oil and gas to flow naturally.7 One of the most important
rock types accessed for natural gas production is shale.8 The United States
has a wide distribution of shale formations throughout the country,9 but
significant shale plays can be found in various states, including Texas,
Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Michigan. 10 Because shale’s
permeability is low, oil and gas cannot move easily through the rock, and
because traditional drilling requires at least fair permeability to be
productive and profitable, it is not a viable option for accessing gas trapped
in shale formations. 11 Fracking, on the other hand, has proven to be
effective at permitting trapped gas to move throughout the formation at a
cost-effective price. 12 Fracking allows trapped gas that was previously
considered inaccessible to move through low-permeability rocks, which
allows the gas to be developed and recovered by drilling operators.13 This
process adds 9 billion barrels of oil and more than 700 trillion standard
cubic feet of gas to U.S. reserves and has increased recoverable oil
reserves by thirty percent and recoverable gas reserves by ninety percent.14
With shale gas being estimated to constitute almost half of U.S. natural
gas production by 2035, the importance of hydraulic fracturing for the
future of energy consumption is huge.15

Lapidus, A.Y. Krylova, B.P. Tonkonogov, Gas Chemistry: Status and Prospects for Development,
36 CHEMISTRY & TECH. FUELS & OILS 82, 82 (2000). J. Daniel Arthur, et. al., An Overview of
Modern Shale Gas Development in the United States, ALL CONSULTING 1, 1 (2008).
6
See Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. 164, 168 (1867) (“Oil is a fluid, like water…”); Wood Cty. Petroleum
Co. v. W. Va. Transp. Co., 28 W.Va. 210, 217 (1886) (using both the percolating waters and ferae
naturae analogies to describe water’s character). See Ground Water Protection Council, supra, note
1, at 15 (noting that natural gas production from unconventional sources increased almost sixty-five
percent in 2007).
7
Laura H. Burney, Hydraulic Fracturing: Stimulating Your Well or Trespassing?, 44 Rocky Mtn.
Min. L. Inst. 19-1, 19-02 (1998). Ground Water Protection Council, supra note 1, at 14.
8
See Qiang Wang et al., Natural gas from shale formation – The evolution, evidences and
challenges of shale gas revolution in United States, 30 RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY R.
1, 2 (2014).
9
Ground Water Protection Council, supra note 1, at ES-1.
10
Ground Water Protection Council, supra note 1, at 16.
11
Typical unfractured shales have matrix permeabilities on the order of 0.01 to 0.00001 millidarcies.
Permeability is considered “good” when it is in the range of ten to one hundred millidarcies and fair
when it is in the range of one to ten millidarcies. Ground Water Protection Council, supra note 1, at
14. Caleb Madere, Covert Capture: Hydraulic Fracturing and Subsurface Trespass in Louisiana, 75
LA. L. REV. 865, 869 (2015).
12
Ground Water Protection Council, supra note 1, at ES-3.
13
Madere, supra note 11, at 869. See Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic
Fracturing: History of an Enduring Technology, 62 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 26, 27 (2010) (“The object
of [fracking] was to break up, or rubblize, the oil-bearing formation to increase both initial flow and
ultimate recover of oil.”).
14
Id. at 27-8.
15
Today in Energy, Shale Gas is a Global Phenomenon, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION (Apr. 5, 2011), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=811.
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2. The Process of Hydraulic Fracturing
Hydraulic fracturing is a complex process that occurs in three
stages. Before the fracking process can begin, the operator must first drill
a well like those used in traditional drilling operations. This process
requires the operator to “[obtain] the required land use approvals, leasing
rights, and a permit to drill.”16 Next, a rig drills a vertical borehole until it
reaches the shale level, which can be anywhere from 4,000 to 8,000 feet
underground.17 The drill bit will then be horizontally deviated and drilled
3,000 to 5,000 feet through the rock formation from the original vertical
bore.18 Once the wellbore has been drilled and cased, the fracking process
can begin. During the first stage, a pad of fracking fluid is pumped into the
well at a high pressure to create vertical fractures in the shale.19 Fracking
fluid, which is most commonly made up of a water-polymer solution and
should have a moderately high viscosity, must be capable of opening and
extending fractures into the rock.20 Next, both fracking fluid and proppants
– granular material such as sand – are pumped into the well to extend the
fractures and hold them open. 21 In the last stage, the fracking fluid is
pumped out of the well, “creat[ing] channels for the oil and gas to flow
through the reservoir into the well.”22
The vertical fractures created by the fracking process are “paperthin,” but their volume is “directly proportional to the volume of the
frac[king] fluid.” 23 Furthermore, fracture length is “inversely related to the
height of the fracture,” with “lower fracture heights correspond[ing] to
longer fractures with the same volume of frac[king] fluid pumped.” 24
Although fracture length and height are more difficult to determine than
fracture width, they can be estimated with some equations.25 Fractures will
generally range from a few feet to 3,000 feet in length. Because the desired
length of fractures is “inversely related to the permeability of the reservoir
rock…lower permeability reservoirs require longer induced fractures.”26
Longer fractures, which result in “greater production rates and ultimate

16

Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229,
236 (2010).
17
William Yukstas, Managing Fractions: The Role of Local Government in Regulating
Unconventional Natural Gas Resources – Recommendations for New York, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 563, 569 (2013).
18
Id. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 237.
19
Burney, supra note 7, at 19-02.
20
Fracking fluid typically consists of ninety percent water, on-half percent of chemical additives,
and nine and one-half percent of sand. Chemical additives include table salt, laundry detergent,
cosmetics thickener, washing soda or soap, deodorant, and food additives. American Petroleum
Institute, Hydraulic Fracturing: Unlocking America’s Natural Gas Resources, API (Aug. 2017),
https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Oil-and-Natural-Gas/Hydraulic-Fracturing-primer/HydraulicFracturing-Primer.pdf. Burney, supra note 7, at 19-02.
21
John A. Harper, The Marcellus Shale – An Old “New” Gas Reservoir in Pennsylvania, 38 PA.
GEOLOGY 2, 10 (2008). Burney, supra note 7, at 19-02.
22
Burney, supra note 7, at 19-02.
23
William Kappel, U.S. Geological Survey, Remarks at the Cornell Law School 2011 Energy
Conference: Gas Drilling, Sustainability & Energy Policy (Apr. 2, 2011). Burney, supra note 7, at
19-02.
24
Burney, supra note 7, at 19-02.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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production,” can surpass the operator’s lease boundary, causing trespass
on another lease.27
B. Rule of Capture
The rule of capture is a state common law doctrine applicable to
oil and gas extraction. Under the rule of capture, “[t]he owner of a tract of
land acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells drilled
thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from
adjoining lands.”28 This doctrine was developed by American courts “in a
time of relative ignorance about oil and gas production, through analogy
to the law of wild animals” and percolating groundwater. 29 Courts
confronted with the issue of oil and gas ownership used these two
analogies to develop and rationalize the rule of capture’s application to oil
and gas.30 For example, in Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v.
De Witt, the court stated:
Gas, it is true, is a mineral; but it is a mineral with peculiar
attributes, which require the application of precedents
arising out of ordinary mineral rights, with much more
careful consideration of the principles involved than of
the mere decisions. Water also is a mineral; but the
decisions in ordinary cases of mining rights, etc.[sic] have
never been held as unqualified precedents in regard to
flowing, or even to percolating, waters. Water and oil, and
still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves, if
the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals [ferae
naturae]. In common with animals, and unlike other
minerals, they have the power and the tendency to escape
without the volition of the owner. Their ‘fugitive and
wandering existence within the limits of a particular tract
[is] uncertain,’... .31
Shortly after the De Witt case, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the rule
of capture in Brown v. Spilman:
[Petroleum oil and gas] belong to the owner of the land,
and are part of it, so long as they are on it or in it subject
to his control; but when they escape and go into other
land, or come under another's control, the title of the
former owner is gone. If an adjoining owner drills his own
land, and taps a deposit of oil or gas, extending under his
neighbor's field, so that it comes into his well, it becomes
his property.32

27

Id.
Howard R. Williams and Charles J. Meyers, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 204.4
(Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer, 5th ed. authors 2013).
29
Burney, supra note 7, at 19-03. Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture – An
Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENV’T. L. 899, 904 (2005).
30
Id. at 905.
31
Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
32
Brown v. Spilman 155 U.S. 670 (1895).
28
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This rationale assumes that oil and gas, like water and wild animals, are of
a wild and “fugitive” nature and move freely throughout rock formations
without respect for property lines. Because the landowner is believed not
to have any real or lasting possession over the substances, courts limited
an owner’s liability for “capturing” oil and gas originating from another
person’s property. Courts also rationalized the rule of capture by an
inability to “determine the ownership of natural gas or oil located in an
underground pool.”33 Because courts generally could not identify where
captured oil and gas originated or to trace its path of migration, the rule of
capture seemed like “an obvious answer to the problem.”34
When the rule of capture is applied to cases where a property owner
uses wells on their own property to draw natural gas from under an
adjoining property, the doctrine limits the owner’s liability to the adjoining
property owner.35 In its infancy, the only restriction on the doctrine was
that property owners capture oil and gas legally. 36 Initially, the only
remedy available to the owner of the adjoining property was to “go and do
likewise.” 37 By limiting trespass liability, the doctrine worked to
“encourage the development and exploitation of natural resources in the
U.S.” 38 This encouragement, however, has led at times to excessive
drilling, which creates inefficiency and waste due to low pressure in the
reservoir.39 For example, because drilling depends on the pressure inside
a reservoir to naturally push oil and gas to the surface, over-drilling can
prematurely lower the reservoir’s pressure, creating nonproductive wells
and wasting the oil and gas that could have been accessed had the pressure
been higher.40 Given that the early or pure form of the rule of capture
showed a “lack of concern for the rights of other owners over a common
source of supply,” courts in later cases developed correlative rights that
limit the doctrine.41
Correlative rights are “limits to, or modifications of, the pure form
of the rule of capture, be they imposed by courts or by legislative bodies.”42
The doctrine of correlative rights was initially discussed in a series of
decisions handed down by both the Indiana Supreme Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court.43 These decisions validated the idea that states can limit
mineral owners’ rights to produce under the rule of capture to prevent
waste.44
In Townsend v. State, the appellant challenged the validity of an
1894 Indiana state statute providing that it was wasteful and unlawful for
33

Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153 (2018).
Eugene Kuntz, The Law of Capture, 10 O KLA. L. REV. 406, 406 (1957).
35
Danielle Quinn, A Fracking Fragile Issue: Courts Continue to Tiptoe around Subsurface Trespass
Claims, 27 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9 (2016).
36
Kramer, supra note 29, at 910-11.
37
Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907).
38
Aaron Stemplewicz, The Known “Unknowns” of Hydraulic Fracturing: A Case for a Traditional
Subsurface Trespass Regime in Pennsylvania, 13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 219, 226 (2011).
39
In re W. Land Servs. Inc., v. Dep’t. of Env’t. Conservation, 26 A.D.3d 15, 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d
Dep’t. 2005).
40
Quinn, supra note 35, at 2.
41
Kramer, supra note 29, at 910.
42
Id. at 912.
43
Id. at 911-12.
44
Id.
34
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any company, corporation, or person to use natural gas for the purpose of
lighting flambeau lights.45 The Indiana State Court held that preventing
owners from “wasting the gas to the injury of others or to…the public”
was within the scope of the state’s police power.46 In this and later cases,
the Court clearly concluded that waste of gas from common reservoirs
would constitute an injury to the public that could be regulated. The Court
based its holding on People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, in which the Indiana
Supreme Court had previously stated that property owners must practice
“due regard” for the rights of others in exercising their property rights.47
However, the Townsend court held that the “due regard” property owners
owe to others is to not create a public nuisance.48
Three years later, in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that “due regard” prevented property owners from
doing more than just creating a public nuisance—it also prevented
property owners from wasting oil and gas.49 The Supreme Court held that
Indiana could enjoin the Ohio Oil Company from “wasting natural gas by
allowing it to escape into the air in violation of the conservation statute.”50
Although the rule of capture would typically have prevented the State from
limiting the property rights of Ohio Oil, since property owners were
previously free to use captured oil and gas however they pleased as long
they did not create a public nuisance, the Court reasoned that wasting the
oil and gas represented an “annihilation of the right of the [other property
owners.]”51 Because the Indiana state legislature has the power to protect
all the collective owners and secure just distribution of oil and gas, the
Court found that the state legislature could legally prevent waste of oil and
gas in order to meet that end.52 And because the Court held that only the
State has the ability to modify property rights secured by the rule of
capture, this case is often read as merely “the starting point for those who
assert that the rule of capture includes a correlative rights component.”53
Correlative rights were firmly and indisputably established by the
Indiana Supreme Court in Manufacturers’ Gas and Oil Co. v. Indiana
Natural Gas & Oil Co.54 There, a mineral owner attempted to enjoin an
adjacent neighbor from using artificial pumping devices to capture a
disproportionate amount of natural gas from the common source of
supply.55 The Court held that the right to prevent property owners from
capturing an unequal amount of oil and gas from a common reservoir,
thereby destroying their neighbor’s right to also obtain oil and gas from
the reservoir, lies with other property owners as well as the State.56 The
holding created, “conclusively, a correlative rights component to the
45

47 N.E. 19, 20 (Ind. 1897).
Townsend, 47 N.E. at 21.
47
31 N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892).
48
Townsend, 47 N.E. at 21 (quoting People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892)).
49
177 U.S. 190 (1900).
50
Kramer, supra note 29, at 913.
51
Ohio Oil Co. v. Ind., 177 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1900).
52
Id. at 210.
53
Kramer, supra note 29, at 915.
54
57 N.E. 912 (Ind. 1900).
55
Id. at 912-3.
56
Id. at 916.
46
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ownership of natural gas.” 57 In order to define the scope of ownership
rights, the Court laid out the following factors:
Natural gas in the ground is so far the subject of property
rights in the owners of the superincumbent lands, that
while each of them has the right to bore or mine for it on
his own land, and to use such portion of it as, when left to
the natural laws of flowage, may rise in the wells of such
owner and into his pipes, no one of the owners of such
lands has the right, without the consent of all the other
owners, to induce an unnatural flow into or through his
own wells, or to do any act with reference to the common
reservoir, and the body of gas therein, injurious to, or
calculated to destroy, it....But the limitation is upon the
manner of taking. So in the case of natural gas, the manner
of taking must be reasonable, and not injurious to, or
destructive of the common source from which the gas is
drawn.58
The Manufacturers’ Gas and Oil Co. case established three limitations, or
correlative rights, on the rule of capture: (1) owners can only capture
natural gas flow; (2) owners cannot injure the common source of supply;
and (3) owners cannot destroy the common source of supply.59
Courts have also limited the rule of capture by preventing
production in a manner that is either reckless or illegal. In Elliff v. Texon
Drilling Co., the defendant acted negligently in allowing one of its wells
to blow out and burn.60 The well was located on a property adjacent to the
plaintiff’s and produced from a common source.61 When the well blew out,
oil drained from the shared reservoir, and the well cratered, creating a hole
that eventually enveloped and destroyed the plaintiff’s well.62 The Elliff
court held that the rule did not protect Texon Drilling Co. from liability
because the company acted negligently and recklessly in their operations,
preventing the plaintiffs from recovering their portion of the oil and gas.63
This case confirmed that negligent and reckless behavior limited the rule
of capture’s protection.
Courts have further held that the rule of capture does not shield
defendants from liability for illegal actions. For example, in People’s Gas

57

Kramer, supra note 29, at 916.
Manufacturers’ Gas, 57 N.E. at 915.
59
This limitation is not uniform throughout state courts. Pennsylvania and Kentucky, for instance, do
not. In Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 A. 1074 (Pa. 1900) that
oil and gas operators could use any appliances known to the trade to make well production as large
as possible. In Kentucky, the plaintiff drilled wells in the same field as the defendant, who then
installed compressors to increase the defendant’s production and decrease the plaintiff’s production.
The court held that the plaintiff’s only remedy was the offset drilling rule. United Carbon Co. v.
Campbellsville, 18 S.W.2d 1110 (Ky. App. 1929). The leading treatise on oil and gas law at the
time, The Law of Oil and Gas, did make a distinction between the two substances, noting that rule of
capture should allow artificial production techniques to be used in oil production, but not in the
production of natural gas. § 32 (3rd ed. 1918). Manufacturers’ Gas, 57 N.E. at 915; Kramer, supra
note 29, at 916.
60
210 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1948).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 562.
58
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Co. v. Tyner, the defendant sought to enjoin the plaintiff from shooting
nitroglycerine down a well to increase natural gas production. The Indiana
Supreme Court held that the rule of capture did not protect the plaintiff
from liability because the plaintiff’s shooting of nitroglycerine constituted
a public nuisance.64 With the Court basing its holding on the illegality of
the plaintiff’s actions, Tyner suggests that illegal actions are not protected
by the rule of capture. 65 This proposition has been confirmed by later
cases. 66 Because the rule of capture does not protect illegal actions,
operators are liable for surface and subsurface trespass. Therefore, the rule
of capture applies only when the operator’s drilling occurs on and under
the land where the operator has a property right.67
Although the rule of capture allows landowners to capture oil and gas
through wells on their own property—even if they escaped from
neighboring property—courts have clearly limited the scope of the rule of
capture. Every owner must have a fair opportunity to produce from a
common reservoir. Furthermore, many states have enacted waste
conservation statutes to prevent the “inefficient use of oil and gas
resources by their lawful owner or producer.”68 These statutes range from
regulation of plugging abandoned wells and drilling operations to spacing
and pooling requirements.69
C. Subsurface Trespass
The concept of property ownership implicitly includes the right to
exclude physical and unauthorized breaches of property by others. 70
Trespass is defined as “an unauthorized intrusion or invasion of private
premises of another” that must be physical in nature.71 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts states that “[o]ne is subject to liability to another for
trespass [when]…he intentionally enters land in the possession of the
other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so.”72 Although trespass is
most commonly the result of surface intrusions, subsurface intrusions do
occur. Neither the courts nor a legislature has settled what constitutes a
subsurface trespass yet. The law does, in some instances, “recognize[] both
airspace and subsurface intrusions” as actionable torts, but that recognition
is not consistent.73 Unlike the rule of capture, which allows landowners to
64

31 N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892).
Id. at 60.
66
See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. 1948) (“No owner should be
permitted to carry on his operations in…lawless irresponsibility…).
67
See Quinn, supra note 35, at 15.
68
See W.L. Summers, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS WITH FORMS VOL. 1 SECTIONS 1.1 TO 6.45 159468 (Thompson West, 3rd ed. 2004) (discussing legislative regulation of waste prevention from
different states by giving an overview of each state’s regulation, as well as detailing different
spacing and pooling statutes in many states).
69
Id. at 159-468.
70
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
71
Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS
1175 (LEXISNEXIS 17th ed. 2018). Colleen E. Lamarre, Owning the Center of the Earth:
Hydraulic Fracturing and Subsurface Trespass in the Marcellus Shale Region, 21 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 457, 470 (2011).
72
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
73
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capture oil and gas from a neighboring property without intruding onto the
neighboring property, subsurface trespass involves an improper physical
intrusion by landowners onto a neighboring property.
The ad coelum doctrine gets its name from the Latin phrase cujus
est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, which means that
landowners own everything above and beneath the soil.74 This doctrine
recognized airspace and subsurface intrusions as actionable. For example,
the New York Supreme Court’s ruling in Butler v. Frontier Telephone
Company demonstrates the power the doctrine once had in protecting a
property owner’s air space. 75 In this case, the plaintiff brought an
ejectment suit against a telephone company for the placement of a
telephone wire above its property.76 In holding that the property owner had
an action in ejectment, the court relied on the ad coelum doctrine:
What is “real property?” What does the term include so
far as the action of ejectment is concerned? The answer to
these questions is found in the ancient principle of law:
Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos. .
.. “Usque ad coelum” is the upper boundary, and while
this may not be taken too literally, there is no limitation
within the bounds of any structure yet erected by man. So
far as the case before us is concerned, the plaintiff as the
owner of the soil owned upward to an indefinite extent.
He owned the space occupied by the wire and had the
right to the exclusive possession of that space which was
not personal property, but a part of his land. According to
fundamental principles and within the limitation
mentioned[,] space above land is real estate the same as
the land itself. The law regards the empty space as if it
were a solid, inseparable from the soil, and protects it
from hostile occupation accordingly.77
The ad coelum doctrine was historically interpreted in an almost
literal manner by the law, allowing property owners to succeed on trespass,
nuisance, and ejectment cases after an intrusion of their airspace and
subsurface land.78 Nonetheless, the development of both the oil and gas
and the airline industries limited its reach, with courts finding that the
doctrine had no place in the modern world.
However, because landowners “must have ownership rights and
control with respect to some distance above and below the surface” in
order to have the right to use and enjoy their property, when a subsurface
74
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intrusion occurs is uncertain.79 For example, courts have uniformly held
that a subsurface trespass occurs when a well begins on one tract of land
but bottoms on an adjacent tract of land without consent.80 This situation
occurs as a result of directional or slant drilling.81 Courts have consistently
held that directional drilling that crosses boundary lines is a subsurface
trespass because “an unauthorized, direct, and physical intrusion” has
occurred.82 For example, in Hastings Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., Texas Company
sought an injunction against Hastings, claiming that Hastings had drilled
three wells that deviated and bottomed on Texas Company’s land.83 The
Texas Supreme Court held that Hastings had committed a continuing
trespass because it “subtract[ed] from the very substance of the estate…”84
In cases of injection disposal, however, courts have not always
found subsurface trespass to be actionable. At liquid disposal sites, liquid
waste is pumped into permeable rock formations, creating a disposal well.
As more waste is pumped into the disposal well, the waste can move across
subsurface property lines. 85 In most cases of this nature, courts have
refused to find an actionable trespass, holding that the plaintiff must be
able to prove actual damages or interference with some reasonable,
anticipated use of the subsurface. 86 For example, in Chance v. BP
Chemicals, Inc., plaintiffs brought a class action suit against BP for
trespass.87 The plaintiffs claimed that fluids from BP’s injection disposal
well leaked into the subsurface of their properties. 88 Although the
plaintiffs argued that proof of a subsurface intrusion alone was enough to
recover, the Ohio Supreme Court chose to reject the ad coelum doctrine,
holding that ownership extends only to the depths that the owner can use
and occupy.89 To recover, the plaintiffs needed to show “physical damage
or actual interference with the reasonable and foreseeable use of the
properties.”90 Unlike the directional drilling cases, Chance demonstrates
that the mere presence of physical intrusion into another’s subsurface will
not be enough for actionable trespass in disposal cases.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides its own approach to
the subsurface intrusion issue, noting that “a trespass may be committed
on, beneath, or above the surface of the earth.”91 The Restatement does
not, however, provide much guidance on how far up or down that right
extends, nor does it comment on whether a plaintiff needs to show actual
damages to recover.92
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THE RULE OF CAPTURE’S INCORRECT APPLICATION TO
SUBSURFACE INTRUSIONS RESULTING FROM HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING

Courts that have faced the issue of subsurface intrusions resulting
from fracking have revolved their arguments around whether the rule of
capture precludes liability. In Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy
Trust, for example, plaintiffs presented the Texas Supreme Court with
issue of “whether subsurface hydraulic fracturing of a natural gas well that
extends into another’s property is a trespass for which the value of gas
drained as a result may be recovered as damages.”93 Although the court
ultimately sidestepped the issue, ruling instead on a separate standing
issue, it did note in dicta that the rule of capture precluded recovery.94 In a
large portion of the opinion, the majority justified its use of the rule of
capture to preclude recovery, relying largely on public policy reasons.95
The court’s application of the rule of capture to the subsurface trespass
issue, however, was improper. In this part, I argue that the rule of capture
has no proper application to the issue of subsurface trespass.
A. The Rationales for the Rule of Capture Do Not Apply
When the rule of capture was first applied to oil and gas law,
courts justified its use as one of necessity. The courts considered the
doctrine to be necessary because they believed that oil and gas were
fugacious in nature and incapable of being traced to their point of origin.
However, given that these rationales do not apply to shale gas or fracking,
as discussed next, the rule of capture’s application to hydraulic fracturing
cannot be justified.
1. Rationale One: Oil and Gas are Fugitive in Nature
As stated in Part I, when the courts began applying the rule of
capture to oil and gas law, one of the two rationales they provided for the
application of the doctrine was the supposed transitory nature of oil and
gas.96 For example, in Wettengel v. Gormley, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reasoned that “the vagrant character of [oil and gas], and the porous
sand rock in which it is found and through which it moves, fully justifies
[the rule of capture].”97 Courts also justified applying the rule of capture
by comparing the minerals to wild animals, claiming that, like wild
animals, oil and gas had a migratory and public nature that made them,
essentially, common property. 98 For example, the Kentucky Court of
93
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Appeals in Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. reasoned as
follows:
In seeking for an analogous condition in the law, the
courts, since the early Pennsylvania case, have compared
natural gas and oil to that of animals ferae naturae. The
analogy, as we have seen[,] formed the basis of the all but
universal doctrine of property in these wandering
minerals. So we may look to that analogous law.99
In applying the rule of capture, the courts examined the characteristics of
oil and gas and applied analogous law. Because the courts examined the
nature of oil and gas to determine the correct analogous law to apply, it is
proper to examine the character of oil and gas in shale formations to
determine whether the analogous law applied is still proper. 100 As
explained in Part I, shale gas is understood to be trapped and unable to
move through the reservoir. Gas in shale reservoirs and other lowpermeability formations do not move and, as such, do not have a migratory
nature. 101 For that reason, applying the law that was applied to wild
animals and percolating waters is no longer analogous—indeed, it is
erroneous.
This conclusion cannot be avoided when looking at the arguments
made by courts at the time the rule of capture was applied to oil and gas
law. For example, in the Hammonds case, noted above, the court claimed
that if a person owns land and a stream runs through that land, the
landowner does not own the fish. 102 But the court also claimed that “a
qualified property in an individual may be acquired by catching and
confining fish within a private pond so they cannot escape.”103 Like fish in
a private pond, which cannot escape, gas in low permeability formations
cannot escape. The owner of the land, therefore, can be said to own the oil
and gas in these formations and the rule of capture cannot be properly
applied. Similarly, in Wettengel v. Gormley, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court noted that the rule of capture does not apply to coal because “the
stratum of coal is as fixed and permanent in its character as are the strata
of superincumbent rocks and earth.”104 If the rule of capture cannot be
applied to coal because it is “fixed,” then it cannot be applied to oil and
gas in the shale level since they too are “fixed.”
Although oil and gas are not solids like coal, which means that
they can move and respond to changes in pressure, their chemical state has
no bearing on the improper application of the rule of capture. The rule of
capture applies in situations where the target can move freely, such as
migration. Even as late as 1921, one of the Texas courts indulged in the fanciful statement that oil
and gas ‘are supposed to percolate restlessly about under the surface of the earth, even as the birds
fly from field to field and the beasts roam from forest to forest.’ In the absence of common-law
precedent, and without the benefit of scientific information, it is not surprising that the courts sought
by analogy to compare oil and gas to other types of property such as wild animals [and] subterranean
water… These early analogies in the light of modern scientific information have been disproven…”).
99
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water and animals. 105 The chemical state of the object at issue has not
historically had any bearing on whether the rule should be applied. 106
Rather, the rule of capture considers whether the objects or substances at
issue have the ability to move unconstrained.107 Despite shale oil and gas
not being solids, they do not have the freedom to migrate at will, making
the rule of capture improper.108
2. Rationale Two: It Is Impossible to Determine Ownership of Oil and Gas
The second rationale for the application of the rule of capture to
oil and gas law was the inability to determine where captured oil and gas
originated from underground.109 For example, legal scholar Eugene Kuntz
noted that “protection of ownership in such substances was an entirely
different matter when the substance could not be identified and traced in
its migrations.”110 Furthermore, when describing why the rule of capture
was adopted, Professor M. K. Woodward noted that “[t]he Rule of Capture
developed as a matter of necessity. When the early cases were decided, it
was impossible…to determine the extent to which the production
represented drainage from neighboring land.”111 By the 1960s, however,
technology became available that made it possible to estimate how much
oil or gas was drained from a neighboring tract. As Professor Woodward
notes, the original rationale for the application of the rule of capture “has
lost much of its force since remarkably accurate estimates can now be
made in the early stages of the development of a pool.”112 Similarly, other
legal scholars have noted that “uncontradicted evidence may disclose the
proportion of the oil and gas that is drained from each tract.”113
With hydraulic fracturing, the questions are whether it can be
determined that fractures have extended into a neighboring tract or
property and how much extracted gas came from the neighboring property.
In 1998, Professor Laura Burney stated that fracture width can be
approximated by volume.114 She stated that fracture length is estimable
through equations. 115 Although estimates are not exact, “the effective
length of a fracture can be fairly closely determined after the fracture
operation.” 116 Furthermore, improvements in microseismic fracture
mapping and analysis have greatly improved the ability to measure
fracture length, height, and volume, with geophysicists noting that
“microseismic images alone can tell us a lot about the basic location and
simple geometry (e.g. fracture length and height) of hydraulic
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fractures.” 117 Fracture length estimates from microseismic images have
been “consistent with observation of offset well pressure interference
during production.” 118 Even in instances where fracture growth is
complex, “there are documented cases where fracture complexity
interpreted from microseismic images is confirmed by frac[k] water
[killing] offset wells.”119 Surface and downhole tiltmeters also “provide
relative fracture orientation and length data.”120 Although science cannot
provide exact determinations of fracture length, it is no longer the case that
it is impossible to determine ownership of oil and gas.
Because we can determine estimates of both fracture length and
effective length, and because we can determine how much oil and gas has
been extracted from each tract, the second rationale for applying the rule
of capture to oil and gas law is no longer applicable. 121 Therefore, its
application to shale oil and gas is no longer necessary. In response, some
courts have argued that since fracture length and the amount of gas coming
from each tract can only be estimated, the rule of capture is still a necessity
for shale oil and gas because determining how much natural gas was
drained from adjacent tracts presents a problem of evidentiary difficulty.122
However, as the majority noted in Briggs v. Southwestern Energy
Production Company, “such difficulty, in itself, is [not] a sufficient
justification for precluding recovery,” especially since juries have been
resolving conflicting expert testimony in various legal systems since the
thirteenth century.123 Furthermore, U.S. Supreme Court cases governing
the admissibility of expert testimony in the federal court system show that
the legal system can handle expert testimony.124
When the rule of capture was initially applied to oil and gas law, it
was done out of necessity.125 At the time, oil and gas were believed to be
migratory in nature. 126 Furthermore, it was impossible to measure how
much oil and gas might have come from a neighboring tract of land.127
Because of these obstacles, the courts adopted the rule of capture as one
of the fundamental principles of oil and gas law.128 These two rationales,
however, no longer apply to shale oil and gas since shale oil and gas are
known to be trapped in low-permeability rock, unable to move. 129
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Furthermore, technological advances allow for accurate estimates of both
fracture length and the amount of oil and gas coming from neighboring
tracts. 130 Because neither of the rationales used to justify the rule of
capture’s application are present with low-permeability rock and hydraulic
fracturing, it is improper for courts to apply this doctrine to cases involving
subsurface trespasses resulting from fracking.
B. Limitations on the Rule of Capture
Although the rule of capture provides property owners with a
broad set of protections, courts have added a number of limitations on the
doctrine that are meant to protect all property owners.
1. The Natural Flow Rule
The rule of capture is inapplicable to subsurface trespass resulting
from fracking because the rule of capture only precludes liability in cases
of natural flow. 131 In establishing limitations on the rule of capture,
Manufacturers’ Gas held that no owner has the right “to induce an
unnatural flow into or through his own wells…” 132 Furthermore, in Young
v. Ethyl Corp., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the rule of
capture does not protect “one who, by force, pushes minerals out from
under the land of another when the minerals would remain in place without
the application of such force.”133 Because oil and gas in shale reservoirs
are trapped in tight pores, they do not flow naturally. 134 Hydraulic
fracturing forcefully creates artificial fractures in the reservoir to create
flow.135 Without hydraulic fracturing, that oil and gas would remain in
place. This limitation on the rule of capture precludes the doctrine from
protecting subsurface trespass resulting from fracturing.
It is important to note that not every court has embraced this
limitation on the rule of capture, leading some commentators to argue that
artificial means of increasing flow is not a limit on the rule of capture.136
This argument is unpersuasive because it is based on cases that operate
under the assumption that oil and gas have a natural flow. Hydraulic
fracturing cases can be distinguished from these cases because there is no
natural flow in low-permeability formations.
Consider the following scenario: A and B, adjacent property
owners, have the same river flowing through their backyards. This river,
which is rich in fish, can be accessed by both property owners through
their respective tracts of land. B, seeking to capture more fish, throws
small bits of food into his part of the river to encourage the fish to
congregate on his property. A sues B, claiming that B is stealing A’s fish.
The court rules in B’s favor, holding that because the fish flow naturally
through both A and B’s properties, B has a right to catch the fish and
130
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increase their chances of catching them. This example is equivalent to
courts allowing for the use of artificial means to increase the flow of oil
and gas in conventional drilling methods because the oil and gas is already
flowing.
Now, let us say that part of the river meandered further into both
A and B’s property, creating ponds on both tracts of land. The river which
used to feed the ponds has dried up, but the bank still exists. B, seeking to
capture the fish in A’s pond, decides to throw dynamite in parts of the dry
river that used to flow through B’s property to encourage A’s pond to flow
back into the bank and through the back of their property. A again sues B
for stealing A’s fish. B argues that the dynamite is just another way of
increasing their chances of catching fish. The reasoning from this second
example, which is equivalent to hydraulic fracturing, is not logical. B is
only allowed to use artificial means to increase their chances of catching
fish when the fish flow naturally through B’s property. When the fish are
trapped on A’s property and no longer flow through B’s property, B cannot
argue that the ruling and reasoning from the first case justifies their
actions. B no longer has access to A’s fish; they are not flowing onto B’s
property at all without artificial means. To make the analogous argument
in the context of hydraulic fracturing would also be a misapplication of the
cases that allowed for artificial means of increasing production in
traditional drilling.
2. Legal Capture
Courts universally accept that the rule of capture does not apply
when illegal means are used to capture the minerals. Once courts clarify
what constitutes a subsurface trespass, the rule of capture cannot be used
to preclude liability should a jury determine that the elements of the tort
have been met. To do so would be to allow the rule of capture to preclude
liability for illegal activity, which is uniformly not permissible.137
IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF
CAPTURE TO FRACKING

Because the law of actionable subsurface trespasses is unsettled,
courts have an opportunity to define an actionable tort of subsurface
trespass in a way that balances the needs and benefits of the oil and gas
industry with protection of small landowners. In this part, I analyze two
leading cases on this issue and explore policy consequences of each court’s
ruling. I then consider a solution presented by Keith B. Hall in Hydraulic
Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines is there an Actionable
Subsurface Trespass?, adding changes to the first element of the solution
that will help to better maintain the balance between the needs of the
industry and landowners.138 Hall’s solution proposes that courts consider
the intent of the trespasser and whether the plaintiff can prove actual
harm.139
137
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A. Policy Considerations: Coastal Oil and Briggs
Despite the rule of capture’s improper application to subsurface
trespass resulting from hydraulic fracturing, courts have continued to
misapply it, citing several policy considerations as a justification. For
example, in Coastal Oil, Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation leased minerals
from the respondents in a tract of land adjacent to a tract where Coastal
Oil held the mineral estate.140 Both tracts were located on the Vicksburg T
formation, “a ‘tight’ sandstone formation, relatively imporous and
impermeable, from which natural gas cannot be commercially produced
without hydraulic fracturing…”141 Although Coastal Oil had three wells
on the tract it leased from the respondents, it drilled a well on the tract it
owned only 467 feet from the boundary of the tract it leased.142 The length
of Coastal Oil’s fractures was designed to reach 1,000 feet from the well,
despite the fact that “[t]he farthest distance from the well to [the other
tract’s] lease line was 660 feet.”143 The respondents sued Coastal, claiming
subsurface trespass and resultant loss of royalties.144 The Texas Supreme
Court confronted the question of “whether subsurface hydraulic fracturing
of a natural gas well that extends into another's property is a trespass for
which the value of gas drained as a result may be recovered as
damages.”145 After quickly finding no actionable trespass, a conclusion
that lacked any real analysis about whether subsurface intrusions
constitute trespass, the Court stated that the rule of capture barred recovery
of the $1 million damages the jury found was owed to the respondents.146
The Court’s application of the doctrine was improper because the
rule of capture cannot be applied in situations where the oil or gas was
obtained by illegal activity, such as trespass. Without first deciding
whether a subsurface intrusion constitutes a trespass and whether Coastal
Oil was responsible for trespass, the court had no basis for its
determination that the rule of capture should preclude liability. Rather, the
Court missed an opportunity to clarify what constitutes an actionable
subsurface trespass.
To justify its application of the doctrine, the Court cited four
policy considerations. First, the court argued that “the law already affords
the owner who claims drainage full recourse.” 147 Second, the Court
concluded that recovery usurps authority from the Texas Railroad
Commission to courts and juries.148 Third, the Court reasoned that courts
cannot determine the value of oil and gas drained from different tracts.149
Finally, the Court argued that, based on arguments in amicus curiae briefs,
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the oil and gas industry does not want or need a change in how the rule of
capture is applied to fracking.150
The Texas Supreme Court’s policy argument shows an
understandable concern for the oil and gas industry and its impact on the
economy. For example, in 2015, the natural gas and oil industry
“supported 10.3 million U.S. jobs and added $1.3 trillion to the nation’s
economy…” 151 In Texas, the oil and gas industry supported almost 2
million jobs and added $326.3 billion in value to the state’s economy.152
The average income for those in the industry is $101,181, which is ninety
percent higher than the national average.153 Additionally, fracking has had
a positive effect on the cost of gas in the United States. For example,
fracking resulted in lower gas prices in 2015, saving Americans $540 in
fuel costs that year.154 Fracking is also being credited by economists as the
primary reason for the increase in oil supplies and decrease in oil prices.155
In 2008, the average closing price for natural gas was $8.86.156 Because of
the fracking boom, that price dropped to $2.58 in 2019. 157 Although
fracking has its own set of environmental problems, it is potentially better
for the climate than alternatives such as coal production. 158 Given the
severity of the climate crisis, governments and firms should focus on
making renewables the primary energy source for consumers, but because
renewables are not currently a viable option for large-scale use, fracking
currently provides consumers with cheap and consistent energy sources.159
Significant damages from trespass would result in increased
exploration costs, as well as greatly affect the revenue of certain states.
Moreover, fear of a trespass claim would likely cause operators to shorten
fracture length, leading to decreased gas production and increased
waste. 160 In concluding that all subsurface trespass recovery would be
precluded by the rule of capture, however, the Coastal Oil court failed to
150
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consider the impact of its ruling on landowners. This argument is explored
in both the Coastal Oil dissent and Briggs.
In Briggs, the appellants asserted claims of trespass and conversion,
claiming that Southwestern Energy, who leased oil and gas rights on a tract
of land adjoining theirs, was unlawfully extracting natural gas from under
their property.161 In response, Southwestern Energy claimed that the rule
of capture bars damages for natural gas drainage resulting from
fracking.162 In rejecting Southwestern’s argument, the Briggs court first
distinguished fracking from conventional oil and gas extraction methods
and then rejected other arguments made in Coastal Oil for the application
of the rule of capture.163 Like the Coastal Oil court, which gave almost no
consideration to whether subsurface intrusion constitutes a trespass, the
Briggs court did not discuss the issue of whether there had been a
subsurface trespass.164 Instead, in Briggs, the Court merely accepted that a
trespass occurred, without considering that the basis of its conclusion, ad
coelum, might not be applicable two thousand feet from the property’s
surface.165
The Briggs court’s policy argument, which was concerned with
how a Coastal Oil-like decision would impact landowners, is as
compelling as the one described in Coastal Oil. The Pennsylvania Superior
Court argued that landowners would be negatively affected because they
cannot adequately protect their interests through self-help due to
fracking’s costliness and complexity.166 Thus, landowners would not have
the resources to “go and do likewise.”167 Furthermore, the Court argued
that the inability for self-help would lead to unfair outcomes for
landowners:
[P]recluding trespass liability based on the rule of capture
would effectively allow a mineral lessee to expand its
lease by locating a well near the lease’s boundary line and
withdrawing natural gas from beneath the adjoining
property, for which it does not have a lease. Such an
allowance would nearly eradicate a mineral lessee’s
incentive to negotiate mineral leases with small property
owners, as the lessee could use hydraulic fracturing to
create an artificial channel from beneath an adjoining
property, and withdraw natural gas from beneath the
neighbor’s land without paying a royalty.168
Because it would be impracticable for landowners, particularly small
landowners, to help themselves by drilling their own wells, they would
essentially be at the mercy of oil and gas companies and left without
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protection. As a result, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the rule
of capture did not preclude liability for the subsurface trespass.169
B. Hall’s Solution: A Balance Between the Oil and Gas Industry and
Landowners
In this section, I will present and modify a solution by Keith B.
Hall, which represents a balance between industry and landowners.
Because the ad coelum doctrine has been rejected in modern times, it
would be improper to base a decision about whether subsurface intrusions
constitute actionable trespass on the doctrine.170 The trend toward “courts
limiting the ability of plaintiffs to recover in trespass for intrusions at high
elevation and great depths” confirms its irrelevance in the subsurface
intrusion issue.171 To decide whether subsurface intrusions resulting from
fracking are actionable, Hall suggests that courts consider the development
of the issue in other scenarios, as well as the valid policy concerns raised
in both Coastal Oil and Briggs. A careful analysis of both considerations
leads Hall to the solution that subsurface trespass resulting from fracking
should only be actionable if: (1) there is proof of harm and (2) the act is
intentional.172
When analyzing how courts treat subsurface intrusions resulting
from a variety of situations, such as slant drilling and injection well sites,
one common requirement emerges: proof of harm. In these cases, the
plaintiff should be able to show proof of harm by showing that they could
“reasonably be expected to exercise exclusive use of the [subsurface] in
some manner that would not involve the landowner himself likely causing
intrusions into another person’s…subsurface,” and that the operator
interfered with that expected use. 173 As such, mere fractures into the
subsurface would not qualify as proof of harm. However, once the operator
pumps fracking fluid and extracts natural gas from the adjoining property,
the harm element should be easily satisfied. Because this requirement is
uniformly accepted in both airspace and subsurface intrusion cases, its
application here should not be construed as improper or out of place.174 In
theory, if the plaintiff is not able to show that they have a reasonable use
for the subsurface, the intrusion would not constitute an actionable
trespass. In a departure from Hall, however, I believe this element should
merely be a formality. It should not be difficult for landowners in areas
rich in natural gas to prove they can reasonably use their property for the
development of that gas. Should this element become exceedingly difficult
to prove or be used by the courts to sway the pendulum in favor of industry,
it should quickly be abandoned altogether.
Because the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a person is
only liable for trespass if the person had the intent to enter another person’s
169
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land, Hall focuses the second part of his solution on intentionality.
Furthermore, the intent of the company serves to preserve the balance
between landowners and industry. To determine whether a subsurface
trespass is intentional, Hall advises that courts consider how deep into the
adjoining property the fractures go and glean from that number whether
the operator designed the fractures to extend significantly beyond its
borders.175 Additionally, he suggests that courts also consider whether the
operators “negligently cause the fractures to extend beyond the border for
a significantly greater distance than the fractures otherwise would have in
the absence of negligence.”176 If it is clear that the operator intended to
fracture into the adjoining property, the intrusion would constitute an
actionable trespass.
At this point, the question of how deep into the adjoining property
the operator should be allowed to frack becomes an issue. Because
operators can control fracture lengths plus or minus five hundred feet, Hall
has advocated for a buffer zone of five hundred feet:177
[N]either Operator nor Neighbor can intentionally use the area within five
hundred feet of the property line, unless they accept the possibility that
they might unintentionally cause fractures to cross the property line. But
if they design their fractures to extend all the way to the property line,
accepting the possibility of unintentional subsurface intrusions, they are
each accepting the possibility that they will not have exclusive actual use
of the five hundred feet of their subsurface that is nearest the property
line.178
Here, both the operator and the neighbor can design fractures to
extend to the end of their property line and not worry about potential
liability problems. Furthermore, Hall believes that because operators can
design fractures up to plus or minus five hundred feet, fractures that extend
beyond five hundred feet into the adjoining property can safely be
concluded as intentional.179 Additionally, I propose that this “buffer zone”
be adaptable to changing technology. As technological improvements
allow for better control of fracture length, the law should respond in kind
to preserve the balance between the industry and the landowner. For
example, if the ability to control fracture length eventually lowers to three
hundred feet plus or minus, the acceptable buffer zone that courts abide by
should also drop to three hundred feet. This caveat prevents courts from
continuing to apply doctrines that are no longer relevant given scientific
discoveries and technological improvements—much as they have done
with the rule of capture.
A buffer zone that can vary over time as technology changes is
preferable because it considers both the landowner and the oil and gas
industry. Because subsurface trespasses extending beyond five hundred
feet would be actionable, the landowner will be remedied for the trespass
and its consequences. On the other hand, the oil and gas industry will
175
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receive protection by not being liable for every minor and unintentional
intrusion that occurs on an adjoining property. This solution also will help
to prevent waste by allowing operators to obtain as much gas as possible
from their property, which, in turn, will benefit landowners and all
consumers of oil and gas.180
V.

CONCLUSION

As the question of whether subsurface intrusions resulting from
fracking are actionable trespasses becomes more prevalent, courts need to
undertake the analysis of what constitutes an actionable trespass. The three
courts that have confronted the issue so far, Coastal Oil, Stone, and Briggs,
have left the issue as they found it—with a big question mark. In this
Comment, I have analyzed a better answer to the issue of subsurface
intrusions resulting from fracking that is both manageable and responsive
to improving technology by looking at policy considerations and
analogous law. Two factors that must be satisfied to constitute an
actionable trespass. The first factor is that the plaintiff must be able to
prove that a harm has occurred. This element, however, is not meant to be
used by courts to prevent landowners from obtaining a remedy. The
second factor is that the defendant’s intrusion must not be intentional. To
ensure the balance between industry and landowners remains intact, I have
proposed that Hall’s buffer zone of five hundred feet be adjustable—that
it can be reduced in size or even removed altogether if technology makes
the need for such a zone obsolete. If an operator’s fractures extend beyond
the buffer zone, the intrusion will constitute an actionable trespass.
Because courts improperly ground their answer to the issue of
subsurface intrusions resulting from hydraulic fracturing in the rule of
capture, this Comment also argued the inapplicability of the doctrine to
the issue. In doing so, I have analyzed two of the main justifications for
the doctrine, including that oil and gas move naturally throughout the earth
and that it is impossible to estimate how much oil and gas comes from
neighboring tracts. The low permeability of shale rock formations,
coupled with vast improvements in technology, show that the rule of
capture is not applicable to fracking or the issue at hand. Furthermore, two
limitations on the rule of capture, the inability to engage in illegal activity
and the natural flow rule, also indicate that its application to the issue is
improper.
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